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Advantages, disadvantages and improvement opportunities of the project strategy for privatization of BT
In the first draft of the strategy that was approved by the Government on the 2 of October 2003 some strengths and
weaknesses can be noted, and some improvements could be offered based on the weaknesses stated.
Strengths of the strategy (Some steps ahead… )
1. It is put forward for discussion by the Minister of Economy and by the Minister of Agriculture together, which is
a sign that the Government has the necessary political will for the privatization of the holding to be put through the
end, and that it has overcome the initial differences in positions. Consequently, the strategy will be easily adopted by
the parliamentary majority, which will accelerate the privatization process. At first glance the lobbies in the
Parliament would be satisfied, which guarantees that the process of privatization of the holding is irreversible
(differing from the BTC privatization, where there are still hesitations on whether and when the chosen buyer will be
really able to exercise his property rights).
2. The purposes of the strategy include attraction of strategic investors for the branch, which is a clear signal, that
not just an ownership change is planned, but an ownership change which will lay out the basis of the future growth,
at least of some companies in the holding, which will gain competitiveness at the international market and will
increase the export potential of the economy. This is in consent with the “absolute imperative of the currency board
– the export-orientation of the economy is a must.” Obviously the 5 multinational companies in the branch are
viewed as strategic investors, and if some of them acquire the property rights of the most prospective companies in
the holding, this will actually help in achieving another goal, pursued by the strategy: investment environment
improvement within the economy as part of the policy for accession to the EU. Having in mind that the big investors
follow strategies of regional penetration and look at the pieces of the puzzle (the pertaining countries) thereafter, we
could assume that the selling out of the prospective companies to strategic investors will have spillover effect over
other industrial branches of the regional economy and these international companies which are at the threshold of
taking investment decisions in the region, will have another strong argument to invest. Given that along with the
privatization process the credit rating of the country had been raised and is pinned at one step behind the investment
rating, means that the investors, which have decided to invest in the region, will have another strong argument to
direct investment to Bulgaria, not to the neighboring Romania, for instance.
3. The strategy shows that the Government is aware of the ineffectiveness of the present structure of the holding and
this awareness opens room for two types of changes: 1) changes in the management structure of the holding and 2)
the separation of two types of companies in the holding: (a)ones that can be sold without difficulties and which can
generate the above positive effects and (b)ones that cannot be sold to strategic investors, because they lack the
needed competitiveness, and for which ways for “recovery” will be pursued and shortly thereafter - methods for
privatization. The classification of these two types of companies has another positive effect. The ineffective
companies will no more lower the price of the effective ones, because they will not be a part of a single “product”
from potential investors’ viewpoint. This type of “product” separation will make the fulfilling of another strategy
goal possible: the granting of maximum budget revenues from BT privatization.
4. The establishing of a supervisory board for the management of the holding, which will be the real decision maker
there, adds a strength to the strategy for two main reasons: 1) the Privatization Agency, which has proved its
inefficiency (in the sense of a low efficiency coefficient, given the goals set and the results achieved4), is denied
access to the privatization process, which at least gives a sign that it will not slow down the process further more; 2)
the degree of privatization transparency will increase because there is a mechanism for the regular reporting of the
implemented activities of the Supervisory Board to the Council of Ministers.
5. Two of the most transparent privatization methods are included in the strategy: auction and public offering of
bonds on the stock exchange.
6. The setting of some obligations for keeping employees after the privatization can be determined as a positive
initiative firstly because probably this has been the price of the compromise between the minister of agriculture (a
compromise that has already been mentioned as positive) and secondly it has not determined for how long after the
property rights transition and what percentage of the employees will be retained. As minister Shuleva has stated
more than several times, will clearly divide the responsibilities of the state and the business as it comes to the social
obligations. The business will be aware that it will retain employees in reasonable limits and the government will
determine the obligations of the business in such a manner that it will be profitable for the business to buy the
companies. Thus the employees retention obligations will not decrease the attractiveness of the companies. In other
words such kind of allocation of the social obligations provides for business and government strategies equilibrium.
7. The use of the funds from privatization is anticipated to be oriented in three correct directions: 1) recovery of the
non-competitive companies; 2) alleviation of potential social conflicts and 3) current shareholders satisfaction as
their right to receive dividend payments will be executed. This model of using the funds is in accord with the good
practices in the privatization process in Central and Eastern Europe and especially with the Hungarian experience.
This confirms the idea that it is never too late to make a step in the right direction. The other strength of this model
of using the funds – the forming of a fund for alleviation of the social consequences and for active measures for
employment of the released work force after the privatization and entrepreneurship development – will lead to a
gradual increase of employment in the long run after the initial lay-off shock. It is also possible that after the
implementation of the alternative agriculture model and after the labour force in the affected regions is made sure
that they can make money from something else besides growing tobacco, there would be a short run shortage of
labour force in the alternative employment sectors.
8. The fate of the “bad apples” after the privatization is being considered because it is expected that the funds of the
privatization will remain within the holding and will serve for improvements to the remaining companies, which will
increase their price. It would probably have a more beneficial effect to the budget if the remaining and meant-to-be-
revitalized companies were sold on the stock exchange, rather through the auction method. The increase of the role
of the foreign banks in the Bulgarian economy, which are more flexible in the withdrawing of capitals from any
country they have invested in than the local banks, has a certain risk that the Bulgarian economy would suffer a bank
system liquidity crisis (but only after a new – and still only hypothetical - financial crisis in the world economy),
which will restrict the opportunities of granting credits to the business and respectively for economic growth. A
well-developed stock exchange would alleviate such a crisis and the privatization though the BSE is a certain way to
its development.
9. A fund will be created for carrying out analyses for the trends in the tobacco sector and to gather projects for
alternative agricultural activities and for stimulating entrepreneurship among the labour force affected from the
negative consequences of the privatization. This is the best way for a long run approach to the problem of the
adaptation of the labour force to the new market conditions and the efforts of the government in this direction have
to be supported.
The strengths of the strategy are not to be considered separately from the Tobacco and tobacco products Act, the
amendments in which were passed by the Council of ministers at the beginning of November. The economic virtues
of certain parts of the amendments are that a flexibility of the potential buyers is granted since the minimum
purchase requirement of a 60% Bulgarian tobacco has been abandoned and the concrete percentages will be
determined for every company for sale. This provides a normative basis for a process that will increase of the quality
of Bulgarian cigarettes, respectively the export and the competitiveness of the sector on the foreign markets. The
other positive amendment to the Act is that raw material producers may unite, which will generate economies of
scale – i.e. opportunities for more investments in the production of better quality sorts, where possible, for
replacement of the imported raw material with a local one and to generate more value added for local producers. The
other amendment, which allows producers to exchange production quotas among themselves, will have a positive
effect on the quantity of the tobacco produced.
Along with the strengths of the draft strategy, some of its weaknesses are also not to be missed out.
(… and some steps backward) Weaknesses of the Strategy
1. There is not a single deadline to be met in the draft strategy concerning the commitments made in it. This fosters
the assumptions that this will be the next strategy for which is spent analytical resource on the “input stage”, which
will not lead to the expected result at the “output” of the process.
2. The resources (human, material and information) intended to be put by the government in implementing the
strategy are not set in the draft strategy. The objectives are ambitious, but when there is initially not sufficient
quantity and quality of the resources, the expected results might not appear at the end. Thus rises the possibility that
the strategy will be assessed as the next failure of the Government, which is not in its interest.
3. In the strategy is not declared a possibility for the government accountability to the society for its implementation.
This contains the danger of lagging behind or at least of neglecting some of the commitments made and hiding of
the possible negative results. This is not in the interest of the Government itself, because when there is no
opportunity for monitoring its implementation, the strategy may remain only drafted but not implemented – the
executors can not receive the needed motivation for achieving the goals set.
4. The creation of two funds is anticipated (for the purpose of revitalization of the remaining companies and the
alleviation of negative social consequences), but there is no mechanism set to define how the money from the “blue
chips” should be allocated between the funds. This plants a time bomb – the resources will be enough only for one
of the funds or small amounts for both ones, which will provide a positive argument for the statement that the
Government pursues the strategy’s goals but, again, not with the required quality.
5. The strategy mentions two types of companies in the holding but does not define clearly which companies belong
to the different types. Maybe they are taken for granted but a strategy cannot and should not be implemented by
default.
6. The project anticipates that privatization will lead to an increase in tobacco purchase prices, but the threat of some
ex post cooperative actions by potential buyers on the tobacco markets is not explicitly considered - which again
may lead to decrease of prices and failure of the Government to accomplish this goal.
7. Support for the development of capital market is set in the project but it will be granted provided that the
remaining companies are made private through the stock exchange while they are still “hot”, i.e. soon after the
privatization of prospective companies or soon after the recovery of each one of the rest is over. If the remaining
companies’ privatization takes too much time, there is a threat of assets stripping, with diverse negative
consequences thereafter.
8. It is not anticipated that part of the resources allocated to the “social fund” should be spent on a PR campaign
among the laid-off workers, which should be meant for popularization of alternative agriculture and
entrepreneurship possibilities created by it.
9. There is a threat of a disloyal competition of the remaining “Bulgartabak holding” and the companies made
private in the branch because the fixed tobacco quantities anticipated to be bought by it mean a single thing – a risk
entrance barriers establishment for competitors in whole regions of the country. Moreover, the remaining
Bulgartabak will certainly have a better infrastructure for purchasing at least in the first post-privatization period,
which will put competitors in a unequal position.
Opportunities for improving the strategy project:
1. Setting deadlines for its implementation. Thus the government will receive a certain amount of trust credit before
the successful completion of a certain privatisation stage in its predefined terms. After the successful completion of
the whole strategy, the government will have the right to declare that the goals set in the beginning match the
envisioned ones to appear the end.
2. Assessing correctly the resource necessities. Thus the government itself will know how to achieve its goal. It will
be able to allocate its own resources – resources will be invested where needed and diverted from where not needed.
3. Organizing regular (monthly are preferred) press conferences on the course of the strategy execution. This will
stimulate the people involved in the process not to release false news to the media (to the public respectively) in
order to increase the trust towards the quality of strategy execution (the government respectively).
4. Duly assessing the necessary resources for both funds, depending on the goals for which they are created.
Resources should be distributed before entering the holding according to a certain mechanism. This will make
humble the lobbies interested in the privatisation procedure. They won’t be able to influence the decision-makers,
provided the percentages of the sales revenues directed to the funds, is not a subject to further revision.
5. Clearly defining where the money from privatisation will go to. It will be most appropriate for these funds to enter
directly the holding and not the state budget.
6. Clearly defining which companies have a potential for immediate privatisation and which ones must be first
strengthened and then sold. This measure will enable the sellers to concentrate on the most suitable ways of selling
for any of the prospective companies. Although they are separated from the non-potential ones, they differ from
each other. For every one of them the highest price can be received only if its selling strategy is different from that
of the others, depending on its features (such as geographic situation, financial indicators, lack or presence of quality
material, human, financial resources, level of management in the last few years, concluded long term contracts with
suppliers and distributors, etc.)
7. If tobacco buyers have the chance to cooperate with one another in order to artificially keep prices low and no
sanctions are imposed, they would certainly do it. This policy stems from the natural striving towards a maximum
profit. In addition to that, buyers are relatively few and they have a real chance to implement this pricing policy.
There are two possible solutions to this: 1) keeping a minimum price level – this is unacceptable from a market and
a social point of view. In the first case the market will be over-regulated, which will create deficits and social unrest.
In the second case, as there are minimum prices, sellers will always get nothing more than the minimum price.
2)Increasing the involvement of the Competition protection commission, which must observe whether buyers
cooperate with one another on prices or quantities. This is the better option from a social and a market point of view,
because when tobacco buyers compete in real market conditions, the price will be higher than the minimal. Of
course, market irregularities can still be present, but here comes the “Tobacco” fund, which will continue to
intervene at the market. This is a lever, similar to the one the government uses at the grain market and which has
shown its ability to positively influence the market parameters.
8. The threat of unclear property rights in the remaining companies can be escaped if the Government summoned its
political will to make them private quickly through the stock exchange after their recovery. In the meantime the
Government can use the increase of market capitalization to receive more than the expected prices for the recovered
companies. Of course, this possibility of unclear property rights is purely hypothetical and nevertheless, there is a
chance for it to happen if we assume the former practice of “obscure” rights in plants under privatization and
besides, if we take for granted the formulation: “If something in Bulgaria can go wrong, then it certainly will”.
9. The promotion of entrepreneurship or alternative agriculture opportunities is an important aspect of the process of
breaking the dispositions of people who have grown tobacco for many generations. It will not be easy for any family
to break these generation traditions and furthermore, many of these families who are potential “alternative farmers”
and entrepreneurs belong to a culture in which traditions mean a lot. Therefore the Government should involve great
efforts for a promotional campaign conforming to the cultural attitudes of the population in the target regions if it is
to be successful with the programs for alternative employment.
10. The access of the new players to the market and to the infrastructure for tobacco purchasing should be arranged
on a market basis. There should be anticipated a possibility for each one of the new companies which will compete
in tobacco purchasing to be able to rent a space in any purchase point in the first post-privatization purchase
campaign. Alternatively, the possibility for competing purchase markets forming in close proximity could be
provided, and terrains and rent (selling) prices are to be fixed soon after or even during the privatization.
Threats for the strategy implementation
They originate directly or indirectly from the project’s flaws, many of which will probably be taken into
consideration and corrected in the course of the final strategy construction. The basic threats, however, come from
the question whether the international situation will be suitable for the companies’ privatization, because ultimately,
given the Government’s desire to put a happy end to the “Bulgartabak saga”, it all depends on customers’
dispositions – either taken as invariables or variables on which the Government can influence in intelligent manner.
In the above-proposed project for privatization many positive steps are set which will help the Government to
accomplish privatization goals, which in turn will lead in the long run to an increase of the economic well-being of
whole regions in the country. The strategy’s success will have another – only this time short-term – effect: it will
help the Government to block the attacks against itself based on the prolonged BT privatization and it will be able to
demonstrate a success story in the whole “sea” of discredited privatization deals which this government infused in
the “ocean” called Bulgarian privatization. Finally, there are many flaws in the strategy and its success is exposed to
serious risks that could be avoided through conformity to the proposed alternatives for its improvement.
